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The Court’s 5-4 decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board1 presents the most expansive 
vision of presidential power over the structure of administrative 
agencies in perhaps ninety years. In holding that the design of the 
relationship between the president, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), and the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (the Board) violated the president’s Article II powers, the 
Court found, for the first time, that the design of an administrative 
agency was unconstitutional even though Congress had not taken one 
of three steps: inserting itself directly into the removal process; 
inserting itself directly into the appointments process; or inserting 
itself into the substance of agency policymaking by retaining a 
congressional veto power over the agency’s actions.2 In all prior 
decisions in which the Court had held the design of an agency to be 
unconstitutional, at least one of these three forms of congressional 
grabs at greater control had been involved.3 Yet, in an expression of 
 
 * Sudler Family Professor of Constitutional Law, NYU School of Law. My thanks to 
Rachel Barkow for comments. I represented seven former Chairmen of the SEC who appeared 
as amici curiae throughout the litigation to defend the constitutionality of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act. 
 1. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
 2. Id. at 3147. 
 3. See. e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733–34 (1986) (holding that Congress may not 
hold the power of removal of the comptroller general); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (ruling that legislative vetoes of administrative decisions are 
unconstitutional). 
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the “unitary executive branch” vision of presidential powers under 
Article II, the Court held that the Board’s design was 
unconstitutional, not because it left Congress too much control over 
the Board, but because it left the president too little.4 
I. THE IDIOSYNCRATIC NATURE OF THE CASE 
Despite the extent to which the Court’s rhetoric and outcome 
endorsed an exceptionally robust view of presidential power over 
administrative governance, the implications of Free Enterprise Fund 
for the more general struggle between Congress and the president 
over administration remain obscure because the case presented such 
an idiosyncratic context. The Court had never seen an administrative 
agency structure like the one at issue; the structure was obscure 
enough that I do not believe any major administrative law scholarship 
had noticed or addressed this peculiar structure before. In the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), Congress had created a new 
entity—the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board—to 
regulate accounting firms that audit public companies.5 Rather than 
creating a new, freestanding agency, Congress decided to put this new 
board inside the SEC. The SEC was given a vast array of powers over 
the Board, including control of the Board’s budget, the power to 
appoint its heads, the power to decide whether to permit Board rules 
to go into effect, and the power to control all the Board’s enforcement 
and sanctioning decisions.6 The one power the SEC lacked, however, 
was to fire Board members at will. Instead, the SEC could fire Board 
members only for demonstrated “good cause.”7 Thus the idiosyncratic 
nature of this structure emerged: Congress had insulated the Board 
from presidential control through two “for cause” removal 
protections. First, the president could remove SEC commissioners not 
at will, but only for good cause.8 Second, the SEC itself could remove 
 
 4. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3164 (“[T]he Act before us imposes a new type of 
restriction—two levels of protection from removal for those who nonetheless exercise 
significant executive power. Congress cannot limit the President’s authority in this way.”). 
 5. Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection (Sarbanes-Oxley) Act of 
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.A.). 
 6. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7211(e)(4), 7217 (West 2009). 
 7. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(e)(6) (West 2009). 
 8. See Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) (finding that 
independent agencies are not subject to the president’s “illimitable power of removal”). 
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Board members only for good cause.9 Thus, the Court confronted for 
the first time an administrative entity twice insulated from direct 
presidential control by good cause removal protections. Although the 
Court had long held that Congress could prohibit the president from 
removing agency heads except for good cause, the Court had never 
seen, much less been asked to assess, agency heads doubly insulated in 
this way. 
Moreover, as the case was litigated, it confirmed the idiosyncratic 
nature of this dual for-cause removal structure. Neither the Solicitor 
General nor the Board was able to document more than a handful of 
other places in the government where officials with major 
policymaking responsibility, like Board members, were doubly 
protected through for-cause removal provisions.10 Hence, it seems 
likely that the Court, relying on the government’s own 
representations about the essential uniqueness of the Board’s 
structure, decided Free Enterprise Fund on the understanding 
(accurate or not) that few other administrative agencies, officials, or 
actions would be affected by its decision.11 On the other hand, the 
dissent marshaled a parade-of-horribles catalogue of officials 
throughout the government who appear to be doubly insulated from 
direct presidential removal, and thus are perhaps situated analogously 
to Board members.12 The Court majority dismissed many of these 
examples as far-fetched and effectively rejected some of them out-of-
hand.13 Despite the dissent, then, it still seems likely that the Court 
believed it was deciding a case with limited practical effect on other 
agencies. 
In Free Enterprise Fund, the Court thus had something of a free 
pass in invalidating the Board’s structure: it could hold this peculiar 
 
 9. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(e)(6) (West 2009). 
 10. See Brief of Respondent at 43, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 
130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (No. 08-861) (noting examples in the Postal Service, Foreign Service 
Labor Relations Board, and Social Security Administration). 
 11. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3159 
(2010) (remarking that “the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is highly unusual in committing substantial 
executive authority to officers protected by two layers of for-cause removal”). 
 12. Id. at 3179 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I still see no way to avoid sweeping hundreds, 
perhaps thousands of high level government officials within the scope of the Court’s holding, 
putting their job security and their administrative actions and decisions constitutionally at risk. 
To make even a conservative estimate, one would have to begin by listing federal departments, 
offices, bureaus and other agencies whose heads are by statute removable only ‘for cause.’ I 
have found 48 such agencies.”). 
 13. See id. at 3160 (majority opinion) (“[T]he dissent fails to support its premonitions of 
doom; none of the positions it identifies are similarly situated to the Board.”). 
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design to be an unconstitutional limitation on the president’s Article 
II powers without putting much else about the structure of 
administrative government up for grabs. Indeed, the immediate stakes 
were even lower, for the Court concluded that it could sever the 
constitutionally offensive provision—the provision that barred the 
SEC from firing Board members except for good cause—and then 
permit the SOX Act to remain in effect and fully operative.14 Thus, the 
case gave the Court an opportunity to strike a blow for a general 
principle that, at some point, presidential control over the agencies 
can become so attenuated as to violate Article II.  And yet the Court 
could do so in a context that had no practical effect on SOX itself, and 
perhaps minimal effect, if any, on any other agency. Free Enterprise 
Fund provided the Court a rare opportunity for a seemingly “free 
declaration” of abstract principle. 
II. TWO WAYS OF READING FREE ENTERPRISE FUND 
Given the idiosyncratic context of the case, then, what does the 
Court’s decision portend for many still-unresolved questions about 
the relationship between the president, Congress, and control of the 
administrative state? That depends on which of two kinds of decisions 
Free Enterprise Fund turns out to be. One possibility is that it is a 
substantively transformative decision, in which the forceful rhetoric 
and analysis concerning presidential Article II powers presages 
further decisions that shift the balance of the constitutional principles 
that structure control over administration of the laws toward the 
president. The other possibility is that Free Enterprise Fund represents 
what I have previously called a “boundary-enforcing decision.”15 Such 
 
 14. Id. at 3145. 
 15. See Richard H. Pildes, Foreword, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 28, 59–76 (2004) (suggesting that vague constitutional constraints imposed by 
the Supreme Court restrain extreme practices and can lead political actors to give those norms 
more determinate content in practice). See also Richard H. Pildes, Caperton and The Supreme 
Court’s Boundary-Enforcing Role, BALKINIZATION (June 8, 2009, 12:05 PM), http:// 
balkin.blogspot.com/2009/06/caperton-and-supreme-courts-boundary.html (“[T]here are 
boundaries on the conduct of public institutions and actors – . . . some lines cannot be crossed, 
even if it is legally impossible to define those lines with clarity.”); Richard H. Pildes, Caperton 
and Boundary-Enforcing Justices Part II: How Vague Law Can Create Stable Outcomes, 
BALKINIZATION (June 26, 2009, 2:15 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/06/caperton-and-
boundary-enforcing.html (“Vague Supreme Court law can nonetheless lead to stable 
legal/policy outcomes.”); Richard H. Pildes, Boundary-Enforcing Supreme Court Decisions Part 
III: How Do We Recognize a Boundary-Enforcing Decision, Why We Often Don’t, 
BALKINIZATION (June 28, 2009, 10:49 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/06/boundary-
DO NOT DELETE 11/1/2010  12:19:05 PM 
2010] FREE ENTERPRISE FUND AND THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 5 
decisions establish outer-bound limits on the organization of public 
power in exceptional or extreme contexts—they establish that certain 
structures or actions have gone “too far”—but those boundaries 
remain vague and the Court does not relentlessly pursue the logic of 
those limiting principles all the way to their ultimate conclusion. 
A. Decision of Broad Principle with Significant Doctrinal Effect 
The most conventional way to read a Supreme Court decision is 
through the rational elaboration of its internal legal logic. That 
approach is the bread-and-butter of doctrinal legal scholarship; it 
assumes that future courts in subsequent cases will apply the 
immanent legal logic of a decision in a consistent way and will follow 
the relevant legal principles to their logical limit. If the principle on 
which a decision rests logically points to decisions that will unsettle a 
good deal of existing practices and institutional arrangements, reading 
a decision in this conventional way assumes that the Court will 
therefore invalidate those structures and arrangements when the 
Court confronts them in future cases. Free Enterprise Fund reflects a 
robust principle of presidential entitlement to control administrative 
government. Thus, if the Court’s decision is approached in purely 
doctrinal terms, the question is what the decision will mean for a 
range of specific issues that all implicate the “unitary executive 
branch” vision or theory of the president’s powers under Article II of 
the Constitution. 
As David Barron has helpfully defined the nature of the dispute 
concerning the unitary executive branch theory of Article II: 
 
There are agencies, and there is a White House. Are they to 
be one and the same—a monolith in which the agencies do 
the bidding of the President? Or are they to be separate—a 
federal executive of functional specialization that permits 
norms of expertise, professionalism, and the rule of law to 
operate within agencies free from the influence of 
presidential policy preferences?16 
 
 
enforcing-supreme-court.html (asserting that boundary-enforcing decisions occur reasonably 
frequently, and not always in closely divided cases). 
 16. David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age 
of Agency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1099 (2008). 
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The unitary executive branch conception of the administrative state 
implicates a variety of specific issues. For example, when Congress 
delegates discretionary decisionmaking power to an administrator, is 
that decision ultimately one the president must, by virtue of Article II, 
have the power to make? Peter Strauss has incisively captured this 
point by asking whether the president is the ultimate “regulatory 
decider,” so that all discretionary decisions of the agencies are 
ultimately his to make.17 Or is the president instead a more limited 
overseer of the regulatory state, one who has various tools to oversee 
regulation and regulators, but one whom Congress can preclude from 
being a decisionmaker should Congress want to rely instead on the 
technical expertise or other skills of administrative officials? Similarly, 
can the president issue directives to the heads of the agencies, 
including the independent agencies, and order them to take, or refrain 
from taking, particular discretionary actions? 
Pushed to the furthest limit, the unitary executive branch view 
asserts that independent agencies are inherently unconstitutional and 
that the Supreme Court in Humphrey’s Executor18 erred by permitting 
independent agencies to exist. According to the unitary executive 
branch view, the president must be able to control all the discretion 
that Congress has delegated to administrators; thus, the president 
must have the power to fire any federal administrator who refuses to 
follow the president’s policy preferences in areas in which the 
administrator is exercising discretion (even on the unitary executive 
branch view, the president cannot order an administrative official to 
take an action that would violate the law). Moreover, there are also 
softer forms of potential legal rules that partly reflect the spirit of the 
 
 17. See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 696 (2007) (“When Congress confers authority on the 
Environmental Protection Agency(“EPA”) to regulate various forms of pollution . . . is it in the 
law’s contemplation giving the President the authority to decide these matters, or only to 
oversee the agencies’ decision processes?”). For other important commentary on these issues, 
see Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 492–515 (2003); Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas 
H. Ginsburg, Commentary, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
1075, 1082–83 (1986); Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for 
a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 987–88 (1997); Alan B. Morrison, Commentary, 
OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 1059, 1059 (1986); Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 
967–68 (1997). 
 18. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631–32 (1935) (holding that the 
President’s unlimited removal power extends solely to “purely executive officers” and 
independent agency officials may only be removed as specified by Congress). 
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unitary executive branch view without going this far in endorsing it: 
Justice Elena Kagan, as an academic, argued that statutes should 
generally be read to give the president the power to control the 
discretion of administrators, unless a statute expressly delegates 
decisionmaking power to the administrator.19 
The unitary executive branch vision of Article II has always been 
based more on an interpretation of the Constitution’s original 
conception of the Presidency, and on the practices of presidents 
through the years,20 than on anything in the Supreme Court’s case law. 
Indeed, the only case that strongly supports this vision is Myers v. 
United States,21 written, perhaps not surprisingly, by former President 
Taft. And surely it is no accident that Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion 
in Free Enterprise Fund refers to Myers as a “landmark case.”22 Chief 
Justice Roberts’s characterization is particularly noteworthy because, 
since the 1930s, the Court has confined Myers to a narrow realm and 
has cabined it in even more since the late 1980s.23 Thus, it is also not 
surprising that the bulk of the Court’s justification in Free Enterprise 
Fund for its expansive conception of the president’s Article II powers 
comes not from the case law, but from early constitutional debates in 
Congress, Madison’s letters, the Federalist Papers, and similar non-
judicial historical sources.24 These have always been the fields on 
which the unitary executive branch view has blossomed. 
Given the robust conception of the president’s Article II powers 
to control the administrative state reflected in Free Enterprise Fund, 
future courts could seize upon the principles and language of the 
decision to support application of the unitary executive branch view 
 
 19. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2251 (2001) 
(suggesting that Congress has the ability to restrict the President’s power over administrative 
functions and personnel, but typically leaves “more power in presidential hands than generally 
is recognized.”). 
 20. See generally STEPHEN CALABRESI AND CHRISTOPHER YOO, THE UNITARY 
EXECUTIVE:  PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008) (cataloguing the 
assertions by presidents of their right to remove from office at will any official exercising 
executive power throughout American history). 
 21. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (holding that Congress had 
unconstitutionally interfered with the President’s removal power). 
 22. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3152 (U.S. 
2010). 
 23. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 686 (1988) (asserting that Myers only dealt with 
situations where Congress was assuming the power of removal). 
 24. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3151–52, 3156–57 (stating that the Framers believed 
the removal power to belong inherently to the executive and that this power was necessary to 
maintain the balance between the branches of government). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/1/2010  12:19:05 PM 
8 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SPECIAL ISSUE  [VOL. 6:1 
beyond the peculiar context of dual for-cause removal structures. That 
Chief Justice Roberts self-consciously planted the seeds for further 
extensions of that view is quite likely. The unitary executive branch 
view was created (critics would say) or recovered (supporters would 
say) during the early years of the Reagan presidency as an 
administration that saw itself with a deregulatory mandate sought to 
bend what it perceived as recalcitrant bureaucracies to the new 
president’s policy agenda.25 Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito 
worked at high levels in the executive branch during those years; 
there is no reason to think they are not as sympathetic to the unitary 
executive branch view as the other elite Reagan administration 
lawyers who advanced that view during those same years.26 Indeed, 
Justice Alito gave speeches endorsing the unitary executive branch 
position before he was appointed to the Court.27 
Free Enterprise Fund presented Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Alito with their first opportunity on the Court to endorse the 
understanding of Article II that underwrites the unitary executive 
branch view. That they took the opportunity to do so comes as no 
surprise. Moreover, based on her scholarship and work in the White 
House, Justice Kagan is more likely to give this view a sympathetic 
ear than Justice Stevens, at least in the context of some related 
issues.28 That is not to say that Free Enterprise Fund’s reasoning will be 
taken to its most extreme potential limit; the Court, for example, 
seems unlikely to revisit the question of the constitutionality of 
administrative agencies given how much water has flowed under that 
bridge. But in areas in which the doctrine is still indeterminate, or the 
legal questions presented novel (such as some of the questions noted 
above), Free Enterprise Fund could logically be read, as matter of 
internal doctrinal development, to support the president over 
Congress in future constitutional conflicts concerning control of the 
administrative state. 
 
 25. See Amanda Hollis-Brusky, Building the Unitary Executive from the Inside-Out (1981-
1988) and the Outside-In (1989-2008) (unpublished draft) (paper delivered at Western Political 
Science Association Annual Meetings, April 2, 2010) (detailing the history of the internal 
executive branch development of this position). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See, e.g., Jess Bravin, Judge Alito’s View Of the Presidency: Expansive Powers, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 5, 2006, at A1 (quoting Alito as saying: “The president has not just some executive 
powers, but the executive power—the whole thing.”). 
 28. See Elena Kagan, supra note 19, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. at 
2251. 
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B. A Boundary-Enforcing Decision of Limited Effect 
It is also possible that Free Enterprise Fund is instead a more 
limited “boundary-enforcing decision” confined to the peculiar and 
limited context of dual for-cause removal structures. Boundary-
enforcing decisions are a major but unappreciated feature of Supreme 
Court constitutional decisionmaking. These decisions typically arise in 
contexts in which the Court perceives powerful competing 
constitutional values and principles to be at stake, and in which the 
Court believes the relevant public or private actors have pushed one 
set of those competing principles to an extreme extent. In these 
decisions, the Court seeks to restore that balance by invalidating the 
action that has taken one side of these competing principles to a 
(perceived) extreme.29 
Boundary-enforcing decisions of this sort are primarily expressive 
in character. That is, the Court’s decision is designed to express the 
view that one set of constitutional values cannot be ignored 
altogether. Such decisions reflect the view that both sides of the 
constitutional tension must be given their due. Characteristically, 
decisions of this sort end up with doctrine expressed in terms of vague 
principles rather than bright-line rules that define clear, necessary, 
and sufficient criteria of their application. Boundary-enforcing 
decisions draw a line in the sand; they indicate there is some limit, 
which courts will enforce, to particular constitutional principles. But it 
is also characteristic of these decisions that the Court does not 
develop the full logical implications of the decision. Doing so would 
be inconsistent with the raison d’etre of the boundary-enforcing 
decision: the point is to assert that some balance must be maintained, 
not to endorse one side of that balance wholeheartedly and for all it is 
worth. 
To illustrate, here are three brief examples. United States v. Lopez30 
is such a decision in the area of Congress’s powers under the 
Commerce Clause. In holding that some outer boundary existed on 
the power of the national government under the Clause, the Court 
drew an inherently vague line whose central importance was to 
 
 29. For a somewhat similar view of the ambiguous nature of the decision, see Paul 
Clement, Free Enterprise: Doctrinal Shift or Snoozefest?, SLATE, June 29, 2010, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2257937/entry/2258635/. 
 30. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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express the principle that Congress’s powers were not without limit.31 
At the time, some saw Lopez as foreshadowing a revolution in 
federalism jurisprudence, in which the Court, following Lopez to its 
full limits, would radically cut back on the scope of Congress’s powers. 
But of course, no such revolution transpired. That is because Lopez 
was not a transformative decision; the Court did not develop the legal 
logic of that decision for all it might have been worth. Instead, Lopez 
has come to stand for the expression of a general principle, which is 
necessarily somewhat vague in application, that, although the powers 
of the national government in the modern age of nationally integrated 
markets are vast, they are not without some limit. 
Similarly, Shaw v. Reno32 is a boundary-enforcing decision with 
respect to the permissible role of race in public policymaking, 
particularly in the redistricting context. The Court felt the force of two 
competing constitutional values: the legitimate use of race to foster 
the values of political inclusion versus the concern to minimize the 
use of racial classifications. Navigating between these values, the 
Court held that extreme manipulations of election district designs for 
racial purposes were unconstitutional33—even though it was clear, as 
the dissenters argued, that there was no precise way to define how 
much influence of race in district design was “too much.”34 Justice 
O’Connor believed that the Court’s role was to plant a flag to 
establish that some limits existed—even if those limits could not be 
defined with precision.35 As with Lopez, some read Shaw as the first 
 
 31. Id. at 556 (“[E]ven these modern-era precedents which have expanded congressional 
power under the Commerce Clause confirm that this power is subject to outer limits.”). 
 32. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
 33. See id. at 657–58 (describing the Court’s approach to racial classifications, and holding 
that a race-based redistricting plan “demands close judicial scrutiny” and may violate the Equal 
Protection Clause if it is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest). 
 34. See, e.g., id. at 671 (White, J., dissenting) (commenting on the majority’s “imprecise” 
use of terminology and stressing that a redistricting plan that “segregates [is] functionally 
indistinguishable from any of the other varieties of gerrymandering”); id. at 680 (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (“Unlike other contexts in which we have addressed the State’s conscious use of 
race, electoral districting calls for decisions that nearly always require some consideration of 
race for legitimate reasons where there is a racially mixed population.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
 35. See id. at 657 (majority opinion) (“Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of 
lasting harm to our society. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our 
history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin. Racial classifications with 
respect to voting carry particular dangers. Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, 
may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of 
a political system in which race no longer matters—a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
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step on the way to the Court holding all race-conscious districting 
unconstitutional.36 Again, though, the Court did not come close to that 
result. Instead, Shaw expressed the principle that government actors 
had to respect some outer limit on the role of race in the districting 
process, but did not lead to a dramatic unwinding of the practice of 
racial redistricting. 
Finally, the Court’s due process decision concerning money and 
judicial elections, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,37 is likely to be a 
boundary-enforcing decision, rather than one that is followed to the 
full breadth of its logical potential. Caperton presented what the 
Court called “extreme facts” and “an extraordinary situation.”38 The 
Caperton Court held that, at some point, a party with a direct financial 
interest in pending litigation can spend so much money trying to elect 
or defeat a judicial candidate who will participate in that litigation 
that due process requires that candidate, once on the bench, to recuse 
himself from adjudicating anything concerning that litigation.39 
Caperton is unlikely to lead to an extensive body of due process 
recusal law. Instead, it draws a line in the sand to express the principle 
that, at some extreme point, due process can be compromised by 
massive spending on judicial candidates in the context of pending 
litigation. 
Free Enterprise Fund might similarly be a boundary-enforcing 
decision of this sort: important for the principle it reflects that some 
limits exist on the process and form of congressional insulation of 
agencies, but not a decision that significantly transforms doctrine or 
practice. The dissenting opinion nicely articulated the competing 
constitutional principles and values at stake.40 On the one hand, the 
 
Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire. It is for these reasons that 
race-based districting by our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny.”). 
 36. See, e.g., A. Leon Higginbotham et al., Shaw v. Reno: A Mirage of Good Intentions with 
Devastating Racial Consequences, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593 (1994) (comparing Shaw v. Reno 
to Plessy v. Ferguson and Dred Scott v. Sandford). 
 37. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
 38. Id. at 2265. 
 39. Id. at 2265–67 (holding that “[o]n these extreme facts the probability of actual bias rises 
to an unconstitutional level,” and asserting that, although most issues pertaining to judicial 
disqualification will be resolved before getting to the level of a constitutional issue, the 
Constitution will, on rare occasions, require the recusal of a judge). 
 40. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3165–67 
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the tension between Congress’s power to enact 
statutes that are “‘necessary and proper’ to the exercise of its specifically enumerated 
constitutional authority” and constitutional principles—such as the separation of powers—that 
limit Congress’s power to structure the federal government). 
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Court had long recognized that Congress ought to have a great deal 
of latitude in designing administrative agencies in response to 
constantly changing circumstances, as long as Congress did not itself 
seek to capture control over the agency through inappropriate 
means.41 Thus, the Court has long upheld the constitutionality of 
independent agencies, such as the SEC, in which the head of the 
agency can be removed by the president only for good cause. On the 
other hand, as the dissent also acknowledged, Article II of the 
Constitution vests the president with the executive powers of the 
government. In order to execute those powers the president must not 
be too removed from effective control over those who administer the 
laws.42 
Justice Kennedy was in the majority in all of the cases I 
characterize as boundary-enforcing decisions, as he was in Free 
Enterprise Fund. That Justice Kennedy is often the decisive vote in 
these boundary-enforcing decisions is no accident: central to Justice 
Kennedy’s conception of the role of the Court, like Justice 
O’Connor’s before him, is the view of the Court as a balance wheel in 
the overall structure of American political institutions. Justice 
Kennedy sees one of the Court’s essential roles to be the insistence 
that boundaries exist on the conduct of public institutions and 
actors—that some lines cannot be crossed and that it is the Court’s 
role to police those boundaries even if it is not possible to define 
those boundaries with sharp legal precision or clarity. Thus, Free 
Enterprise Fund might be a boundary-enforcing decision precisely 
because Justice Kennedy viewed Congress as simply having taken the 
legitimate constitutional values of agency independence “too far.” The 
peculiar, idiosyncratic structure of the Board—with the Board twice 
insulated by for-cause removal protections—might have been thought 
to tip the balance between the competing constitutional concerns too 
far in one direction.43 After all, as the Court pointed out, if Congress 
 
 41. See id. at 3165–66, 3168 (discussing the “needed flexibility” granted to Congress 
through the Necessary and Proper Clause and the benefits of a “functional approach [which] 
permits Congress and the President the flexibility needed to adapt statutory law to changing 
circumstances”). 
 42. See id. at 3165 (“[The structural separation-of-powers principle], along with the 
instruction in Article II, § 3 that the President ‘shall take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed,’ limits Congress’s power to structure the Federal Government. Indeed, this Court has 
held that the separation-of-powers principle guarantees the President the authority to dismiss 
certain Executive Branch officials at will.”(internal citations omitted)). 
 43. The dissent argued that the Court could have avoided the constitutional question 
altogether by holding that the statute creating the SEC does not limit the president to removing 
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can create two layers of independence, what is to stop it from creating 
five layers?44 (The answer might be practical, not logical; in over 200 
years, Congress has never tried to do so.) Perhaps, for Justice 
Kennedy, the specter of limitless insulation of agency officials 
suggested a system out of kilter, one in which it was important for the 
Court to express the principle that the president’s Article II powers 
must also be given their due. If that view is what accounts for Justice 
Kennedy’s vote, then Free Enterprise Fund might define an outer 
boundary on congressional control over the design of the 
administrative state without standing for a more expansive 
endorsement of the unitary executive branch view in general. 
Boundary-enforcing decisions come in various forms. At times, 
Justices explicitly signal, through narrowing concurring opinions, that 
their agreement with the majority is limited and that the decision at 
issue should not be assumed to have broad implication. That is what 
Justices Kennedy and O’Connor did through their concurrences in 
Lopez.45 But boundary-enforcing decisions do not always come with a 
narrowing concurrence attached. Neither Shaw v. Reno nor Caperton 
 
SEC commissioners only for good cause, but instead permits presidential at-will removal. The 
statute does not contain any textual provision incorporating a good-cause removal standard. 
This is perhaps not surprising, since the Act was enacted during the era in which Myers, which 
suggested such provisions were unconstitutional, was the governing law. Nonetheless, based on 
central features of the SEC’s structure, which Congress typically uses for independent agencies, 
such as the SEC’s multi-member structure and fixed terms of office, the courts, including the 
Supreme Court, have assumed for years that SEC commissioners can only be removed for good 
cause. Holding that the Act did not in fact so constrain the president would have eliminated the 
constitutional problem that troubled the Court, but would have destabilized the long-standing 
understanding that the SEC is an independent agency; as a practical matter, such a holding 
would have more radical, with more far-reaching, consequences than the Court’s holding that 
the dual for-cause removal structure was unconstitutional. Nonetheless, it is perhaps some signal 
of the importance to the Court of establishing a boundary principle on the extent to which 
Congress can insulate administrative officials that the Court bypassed an opportunity to decide 
the case on a formally narrower statutory, rather than constitutional, ground. 
 44. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3154 (majority opinion) (“Indeed, if allowed to stand, 
this dispersion of responsibility could be multiplied. If Congress can shelter the bureaucracy 
behind two layers of good-cause tenure, why not a third? At oral argument, the Government 
was unwilling to concede that even five layers between the President and the Board would be 
too many. The officers of such an agency—safely encased within a Matryoshka doll of tenure 
protections—would be immune from Presidential oversight, even as they exercised power in the 
people’s name.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 45. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The 
history of the judicial struggle to interpret the Commerce Clause during the transition from the 
economic system the Founders knew to the single, national market still emergent in our own era 
counsels great restraint before the Court determines that the Clause is insufficient to support an 
exercise of the national power. That history gives me some pause about today’s decision, but I 
join the Court’s opinion with these observations on what I conceive to be its necessary though 
limited holding.”). 
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v. Massey included such concurrences (and it is too early to be certain 
that Caperton will be applied in as limited a way as I anticipate). 
Sometimes, Justices will try to engage in boundary-enforcing not by 
holding the action at issue unconstitutional, but by stating forcefully 
that there is some line out there whose crossing would create 
unconstitutional action—even as the Justices uphold the action at 
issue. This is what Justice Kennedy has attempted to do concerning 
claims of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering; his opinions 
announce that extreme partisan gerrymandering might be 
unconstitutional in some context, even as he has not yet held any 
particular gerrymander to violate the Constitution.46 But boundary-
enforcing decisions that actually drop the hammer by holding action 
unconstitutional, instead of merely threatening to do so in some 
future case, are likely to be of greater practical effect to both political 
actors and lower courts. 
We can only speculate about what leads a Justice to signal 
explicitly when a decision should be understood in only limited, 
boundary-enforcing ways. Certainly the absence of such a signal 
makes it more likely the lower courts will apply the decision in the 
more conventional way. Perhaps it depends on how potentially 
disruptive the Justice fears the decision will be. In the context of 
Lopez, in which the Court held Congress’s exercise of Commerce 
Clause power unconstitutional for the first time since the New Deal,47 
it was easy to anticipate in advance that the decision would spawn 
enormous uncertainty and concern that the Court was about to limit 
dramatically long-established congressional powers. Perhaps it 
depends on how aware a Justice is of the most expansive potential 
interpretations latent in a particular decision; Justices have varying 
levels of expertise in different areas of the law. Or, perhaps the answer 
lies in more mundane matters, such as how much time or interest a 
Justice has in a particular case. 
Moreover, that the five-Justice majority in Free Enterprise Fund is 
internally divided on the meaning and scope of the decision is also 
 
 46. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 311–14 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (asserting 
that under a Fourteenth Amendment standard it is possible that a reapportionment scheme 
could be found unconstitutional, and contending that “[though] no such standard has emerged 
in this case [that] should not be taken to prove that none will emerge in the future. Where 
important rights are involved, the impossibility of full analytical satisfaction is reason to err on 
the side of caution.”). 
 47. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 (holding the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 
unconstitutional because it exceeded the scope of the Commerce Clause). 
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entirely possible. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, 
and Alito might hope that the decision becomes a transformative one 
on the scope of the president’s control over the administrative state. 
Justice Kennedy, none of whose prior opinions suggests he endorses a 
robust view of the president’s Article II powers in this area, might 
understand the decision as a more limited, boundary-enforcing one 
made necessary by Congress’s creation of a novel structure that 
pushed the limits of prior constitutional understandings. As with all 
decisions, which kind of decision Free Enterprise Fund turns out to be 
will not be knowable until the Court chooses to speak on these 
questions again. 
